Gorape
Gorapeは、Keycloakのaccess tokenで認証し、ハードウェアアテステーションとデバイス管理を提供するGoバックエンドです。
- Keycloak RealmとProjectを1対1で対応
- Project/Group単位の権限管理
- PostgreSQLによるテナント分離
- Redisによる単回使用Challenge
- Legacy Android Keystore Key Attestation API
- WebAuthn passkey registration/assertionとattestation検証(既定deny)
- OpenAPI 3.1 / JSON REST API
Architecture
Native / browser client ── Authorization Code + PKCE ── Keycloak (idp.gorapeflutter.site)
│ │
│ access token │ iss + sub / AMR
└───────────────────────────► Gorape API (api.gorapeflutter.site / RP ID: gorapeflutter.site) ◄──┘
│ │
PostgreSQL Redis
The server normalizes listener host/port, TLS, OIDC, attestation, and WebAuthn settings from configuration (GF-10037 and starts the HTTP listener and an optional TLS listener (GF-10001; the router composes auth, rate-limit, CORS, and request-ID middleware with the REST controllers (GF-10002.
Gorape is not an identity provider. Keycloak owns users, passwords, and login
sessions. Gorape validates access tokens and resolves principals by iss + sub
(GF-10003, GF-10005, GF-10006). The platform-provisioning API uses a
separate configured issuer and role gate (GF-10004, GF-10023, GF-10024).
Gorape stores only project-scoped principals, groups, roles, devices, public
keys/WebAuthn credential state, verified attestation summaries, and audit
events. Gorape passkeys are a separate RP credential from Keycloak passkeys.
Project-scoped tables and repository queries are isolated by project_id.
Effective permissions combine Gorape role bindings and dynamic Keycloak claims
(GF-10007, GF-10025). Device registration and possession operations also
require a validated amr: ["passkey"] claim (GF-10008); challenges are
short-lived, project/subject/purpose-bound, and consumed once (GF-10009). Root
Domain is a cluster boundary and is not managed by the database or REST API.
ER diagram
erDiagram
PROJECTS ||--o{ GROUPS : contains
PROJECTS ||--o{ PRINCIPALS : identifies
PROJECTS ||--o{ ROLE_DEFINITIONS : defines
PRINCIPALS ||--o{ ROLE_BINDINGS : receives
ROLE_DEFINITIONS ||--o{ ROLE_BINDINGS : grants
GROUPS o|--o{ ROLE_BINDINGS : scopes
PRINCIPALS ||--o{ DEVICES : owns
DEVICES ||--o{ DEVICE_KEYS : has
DEVICE_KEYS ||--o{ ATTESTATIONS : verifies
DEVICES ||--o{ DEVICE_GROUP_BINDINGS : assigned
GROUPS ||--o{ DEVICE_GROUP_BINDINGS : includes
DEVICES ||--o{ DEVICE_EVENTS : emits
PRINCIPALS ||--o{ DEVICE_EVENTS : acts
PROJECTS {
uuid id PK
text slug UK
text issuer UK
text realm
text status
}
GROUPS {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
text slug
}
PRINCIPALS {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
text issuer
text subject
}
ROLE_DEFINITIONS {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
text key
jsonb permissions
}
ROLE_BINDINGS {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
uuid principal_id FK
uuid group_id FK
text role_key FK
}
DEVICES {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
uuid owner_id FK
text platform
text status
}
DEVICE_KEYS {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
uuid device_id FK
bytea public_key
jsonb credential_data "WebAuthn credential state; attestation blob stripped"
}
ATTESTATIONS {
uuid id PK
uuid project_id FK
uuid key_id FK
text verification_status
}
API endpoints
/healthはpublicです。通常のproject APIはKeycloak access tokenを必要とし、/v1/projectsはissuerからprojectを解決します。Platform provisioningはplatform issuerのadmin roleで保護します。Browser passkey handoffの3 endpointだけはBearer tokenを受け取りません。代わりにoptions callから発行された短期・単回使用challenge IDをcapabilityとして検証します。RouteとmiddlewareはGF-10002で登録されます。Swagger列は該当operationを直接開きます。
| Method | Endpoint | Purpose | Swagger |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /health | Liveness (GF-10002) | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects | Token issuerに対応するProject一覧 (GF-10003) | Open |
| POST | /v1/passkeys/browser/options | Capabilityでbrowser ceremony optionsを取得 (GF-10020) | Open |
| POST | /v1/passkeys/browser/registration/verify | Browser registration responseを検証 (GF-10021) | Open |
| POST | /v1/passkeys/browser/authentication/verify | Browser assertionを検証 (GF-10022) | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId} | Project取得 | Open |
| POST | /v1/platform/provisioning/plan | Platform admin向けprovisioning plan (GF-10023) | Open |
| POST | /v1/platform/provisioning/apply | Platform admin向けprovisioning適用 (GF-10024) | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/permissions | Effective permission取得 (GF-10007) | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups | Group一覧 | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups | Group作成 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId} | Group取得 | Open |
| PATCH | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId} | Group更新 | Open |
| DELETE | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId} | Group削除 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices | Device一覧 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId} | Device取得 | Open |
| DELETE | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId} | Device失効 | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/registration/challenge | 登録Challenge発行 (passkey AMR required, GF-10008) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/registration/verify | Attestation検証と登録 (passkey AMR required, GF-10008) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/passkeys/registration/options | Gorape RP用WebAuthn registration options (GF-10016) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/passkeys/registration/verify | WebAuthn credential/attestation検証と登録 (GF-10017) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId}/challenge | 鍵保有証明Challenge発行 (passkey AMR required, GF-10008) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId}/verify | 鍵保有証明検証 (passkey AMR required, GF-10008) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId}/passkeys/authentication/options | WebAuthn assertion options (GF-10018) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId}/passkeys/authentication/verify | WebAuthn assertion検証 (GF-10019) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/proof-requests | 外部サービス向け操作結合WebAuthn Challenge発行 (GF-10035) | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/proof-requests/{proofId}/verify | 外部サービス向け操作結合WebAuthn Assertion検証 (GF-10036) | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId}/devices | Group Device一覧 | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId}/devices | DeviceをGroupへ割当 | Open |
| DELETE | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId}/devices/{deviceId} | Group割当解除 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/roles | Project Role binding一覧 | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/roles | Project Role binding設定 | Open |
| DELETE | /v1/projects/{projectId}/roles/{bindingId} | Project Role binding削除 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId}/roles | Group Role binding一覧 | Open |
| POST | /v1/projects/{projectId}/groups/{groupId}/roles | Group Role binding設定 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/role-definitions | Role定義一覧 | Open |
| PUT | /v1/projects/{projectId}/role-definitions/{key} | Role定義作成・更新 | Open |
| DELETE | /v1/projects/{projectId}/role-definitions/{key} | Role定義削除 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/attestation/capabilities | Legacy native-key verifier対応状況 | Open |
| GET | /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId}/attestation | Attestation履歴 | Open |
Client integration
- ProjectのKeycloak RealmへAuthorization Code + PKCEでログインします。
- Signed access tokenを
Authorization: Bearer ...で送信します。ID tokenはAPI認証に使いません。Gorapeはissuer/subjectでPrincipalを解決します(GF-10003, GF-10005, GF-10006)。 - Device登録とproofには、署名検証済みtokenの
amrにpasskeyが必要です(GF-10008)。パスワードだけのログインではDevice操作を許可しません。 - Android/iOS/macOS/WebではGorape RPのcreation optionsを取得し、OS/browser credential providerの完全なWebAuthn responseをregistration verify endpointへ送ります(GF-10016, GF-10017)。
- 継続的なproofではDevice IDに紐づいたassertion optionsを取得し、providerにchallengeを署名させます(GF-10018, GF-10019)。
- LinuxはブラウザにOIDC tokenを渡さず、短期・単回使用capabilityによるbrowser handoffを利用します(GF-10020, GF-10021, GF-10022)。
- 旧Android Keystore登録APIは互換性用に残っていますが、WebAuthn passkeyと混同しないでください。
WebAuthnのRP IDはKeycloak RP IDと別に構成します。秘密鍵をGorapeへ送信してはいけません。Attestation formatとtrust anchorは WebAuthn設定を参照してください。
Gorape RP passkeys and attestation
In production, Gorape must use a WebAuthn RP ID distinct from Keycloak. A
Keycloak passkey cannot be presented as a Gorape credential when their RP IDs
differ. After OIDC sign-in, the client performs a separate Gorape registration
ceremony and later uses the passkey for device possession proofs. Device
registration and proof additionally require a signed Keycloak access token
whose amr claim contains passkey; password-only login remains read-only for
device operations.
The local Docker configuration uses gorapeflutter.site as the Gorape RP ID,
separate from Keycloak’s idp.gorapeflutter.site (*.gorapeflutter.site
resolves to 127.0.0.1 in local development). For Android Credential Manager
and Apple Associated Domains, the public association files are served from
https://gorapeflutter.site/.well-known/assetlinks.json and
https://gorapeflutter.site/.well-known/apple-app-site-association. The API
itself runs on https://api.gorapeflutter.site:8443 (or http://api.gorapeflutter.site:8000);
Android Credential Manager and Apple AuthenticationServices validate the RP
domain and app association separately. Production deployments can substitute
any custom domain in etc/server.yaml and must configure production signing
fingerprints and trusted attestation roots.
Deployment caveat: the apex
gorapeflutter.sitecurrently has no public A/AAAA record (only NS/SOA). External retrieval of the apex/.well-known/association files by Google/Apple, and public TLS issuance, are therefore unverified until DNS control is available. Local development uses the*.gorapeflutter.site -> 127.0.0.1records and an explicit local CA; TLS certificate verification must never be disabled as a workaround.
Ceremony
- The authenticated client requests creation options. Gorape creates a single-use challenge and binds it to project, principal, platform, device name, and WebAuthn session data in Redis.
- The client passes the returned
public_keyoptions to its OS/browser credential provider and forwards the completePublicKeyCredentialresponse, includingclientDataJSONandattestationObject. - Gorape verifies the challenge, ceremony type, configured RP ID (GF-10010, GF-10011), exact allowed origin, credential ID, credential public key, format-specific attestation statement, and trust chain before storing the device (GF-10013, GF-10017).
- For proof, Gorape issues a new single-use WebAuthn request challenge. The provider signs it; Gorape validates the assertion and updates authenticator counter/backup state.
The private credential key remains in the authenticator/provider. The server stores the credential ID, COSE public key, and WebAuthn credential state. The raw registration attestation object and certificate chain are not retained in the credential record after verification.
The recorded security_level names the verified attestation format (for
example, tpm_attested or apple_anonymous_attestation); it is not a claim
about boot integrity, device uniqueness, revocation status, or ongoing
compliance.
Apply migrations/000003_webauthn.up.sql and
migrations/000004_assurance.up.sql to every existing database before
deploying the new server binary. They add nullable WebAuthn credential state,
persisted assurance evidence, and allow the web and linux device platforms;
legacy device rows remain valid and are evaluated conservatively.
Assurance levels and policy
The assurance level is derived only from verified server-side evidence. The
client-supplied platform label is never used to promote a credential. The RP
stores the verification status and the assurance status separately, so a
successful fmt=none registration is device_bound_unattested, not
hardware_attested.
| Level | Verified registration | BE flag | Hardware attestation |
|---|---|---|---|
hardware_attested | required | BE=false | required |
device_bound_unattested | required | BE=false | not required |
standard_passkey | required | BE=true (synchronizable) | ignored |
rejected | failed or unusable | any | any |
BE is backup eligibility and is immutable for a credential. BS is backup
state and may change; BE=false with BS=true, or a change to BE after
registration, is rejected. A synchronizable credential is always
standard_passkey, even when the authenticator also supplies a hardware
attestation statement, because the key can leave the original device.
Hardware protection is accepted only when the verified evidence establishes non-exportable key residency:
android-keywith a verified TEE/StrongBox key description and locked, verified boot;appleanonymous attestation chained to the configured Apple roots;tpmattestation chained to the configured TPM roots;fido-u2fattestation chained to the configured U2F roots;- a FIDO MDS entry whose
keyProtectionincludeshardware,tee,secure_element, orsmart_card.
packed and self attestation do not by themselves prove hardware key
protection. They remain device_bound_unattested unless another verified
source (for example an MDS entry) adds hardware evidence. fido_mds_verified
likewise records metadata verification; it does not imply hardware protection.
The explicit policy controls registration and every later assertion:
attestation:
webauthn:
assurance:
required: standard_passkey # or device_bound_unattested / hardware_attested
allow_synced_passkeys: true # false for high assurance
hardware_formats: [android-key, apple, tpm, fido-u2f]
required: hardware_attested requires allow_synced_passkeys: false and at
least one hardware-capable format or FIDO MDS; this is validated at startup.
When MDS is disabled, a typed-nil provider is normalized to an actual nil before
the WebAuthn library is initialized, so verification uses the configured format
trust anchors instead of dereferencing an absent MDS provider (GF-10045).
External proof requests may raise the requirement with required_assurance,
but cannot lower the service policy. The same level names are returned by
registration and proof verification.
Cross-device authentication (CDA)
CDA is an authenticator capability, not an RP policy. Gorape records the
transports returned by the authenticator during registration and passes them
back unchanged. It does not inject hybrid or internal into
allowCredentials: an authenticator that did not advertise hybrid cannot be
made CDA-capable by a hint. When the credential record has no transports, the
RP omits the hint and lets the client choose. Device-bound keys generated by
gf-app in the OS keystore (Apple Secure Enclave, Android Keystore, Windows
CNG/TPM) are separate from WebAuthn credentials and are never substituted for a
CDA assertion; CDA uses the FIDO credential held by the authenticator.
Metadata and revocation re-evaluation
For MDS-backed credentials Gorape re-evaluates the stored AAGUID against the
current signed metadata on assertion. A missing entry or an unacceptable
authenticator status downgrades the credential to rejected. When an
attestation certificate was retained and a revocation checker is configured,
the leaf certificate is re-checked against CRL/OCSP subject to the configured
cache TTL. The result and last_evaluated_at are persisted. Network failures
and unknown status fail closed for high-assurance decisions.
Default-deny policy
Passkey registration is disabled until a Gorape RP ID/origin and an attestation
policy are configured. etc/server.yaml.example intentionally has an empty
format allowlist, allow_none: false, and allow_self_attestation: false.
etc/server.yaml.docker requests direct attestation and rejects fmt: none
so Android hardware-attestation support can be tested without silently
accepting an unattested result. Unknown formats, untrusted certificate chains,
and missing trust anchors fail closed. The client’s requested direct
conveyance is only a preference; the response’s actual fmt is authoritative.
Application:
Server:
webauthn:
rp_id: gorapeflutter.site
rp_display_name: Gorape
rp_origins:
- https://gorapeflutter.site
- https://app.gorapeflutter.site
# Android Credential Manager native origin, if used by this app:
- android:apk-key-hash:BASE64URL_CERTIFICATE_HASH
# gf-app hosts the Linux browser ceremony page; Gorape remains API-only.
portal_origin: https://app.gorapeflutter.site
browser_api_origin: https://api.gorapeflutter.site
attestation_conveyance: direct
user_verification: required
web_origins: [https://app.gorapeflutter.site]
attestation:
webauthn:
allowed_formats: [android-key, tpm, apple]
allow_none: false
allow_self_attestation: false
trust_anchors:
android-key: [/etc/gorape/android-attestation-roots.pem]
tpm: [/etc/gorape/tpm-attestation-roots.pem]
apple: [/etc/gorape/apple-webauthn-roots.pem]
The root files must contain PEM certificates. android-key falls back to the
legacy android_trust_anchors list when its WebAuthn-specific list is empty.
packed and fido-u2f can also be enabled, but they require their own trusted
roots. Packed self-attestation has no certificate chain and requires both
packed in allowed_formats and allow_self_attestation: true; it is recorded
as self_attested, not hardware-backed. none is controlled only by the
separate allow_none flag.
Gorape currently validates the WebAuthn TPM 2.0 statement, including its
credential-key binding and AIK certificate properties, using
github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn v0.14.0, then chains the supplied certificates
to the configured format-specific roots. Root allowlisting does not perform
CRL/OCSP checks or a FIDO Metadata Service status check; keep trust bundles
current and account for revocation operationally.
RP domain association and platform behavior
The RP ID must be stable and must match the app’s platform association:
| Platform | Association / returned evidence |
|---|---|
| Android | Serve Digital Asset Links with delegate_permission/common.get_login_creds and delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls at https://<rp-id>/.well-known/assetlinks.json for the package/signing certificate. Credential Manager may return android-key or none. |
| iOS/macOS | Serve AASA webcredentials entries and build with webcredentials:<rp-id> Associated Domains. AuthenticationServices controls platform attestation conveyance; the response may be Apple anonymous attestation or none. |
| Windows | Uses the Windows WebAuthn API. A TPM tpm statement is provider/OS dependent and is not guaranteed by requesting direct. |
| Web | Must be served in a secure context; RP ID must be the page host or a registrable parent domain. Browser/provider policy may anonymize attestation to none. |
| Linux | The gf-app web target opens the browser ceremony page. Chrome/Firefox WebAuthn uses its configured platform or roaming authenticator. Gorape remains API-only. |
Every browser or native origin must be configured exactly in rp_origins.
HTTPS origins must be within the RP ID; HTTP is accepted only for localhost
development. Android’s android:apk-key-hash: native origin is an explicit
exact-match exception. Never configure wildcard origins.
portal_origin must be both the gf-app ceremony page origin and a member of
rp_origins; browser_api_origin is the public Gorape API origin used by the
cross-origin browser handoff and must be reachable from that page. Add the
portal origin to web_origins for exact CORS authorization. The fragment
contains a short-lived challenge ID (never the OIDC token), and the browser
submits the response to one-time capability endpoints.
Attestation does not prove OS boot integrity or ongoing device compliance. Provider behavior varies by OS version, account configuration, authenticator, and whether credentials are synced. The platform label sent by the client is metadata only; authorization and attestation assurance come from the verified WebAuthn response and server policy.
RP ID migration and credential re-enrollment
WebAuthn credentials are cryptographically bound to their RP ID (rpIdHash = SHA-256(rpId) in authenticatorData). Changing Application.Server.WebAuthn.rp_id (for example from gorapeflutter.github.io or localhost to gorapeflutter.site, or from gorapeflutter.site to a custom production domain) makes previously enrolled WebAuthn credentials unusable under the new RP ID.
When migrating RP IDs:
- Update
Application.Server.WebAuthn.rp_id,rp_origins,portal_origin,browser_api_origin, andweb_originsinetc/server.yaml(oretc/server.yaml.docker). - Publish the updated
/.well-known/assetlinks.jsonand/.well-known/apple-app-site-associationonhttps://<new-rp-id>/.well-known/. - Update the native app’s Android
asset_statementsand Applecom.apple.developer.associated-domains(webcredentials:<new-rp-id>). - Revoke existing devices bound to the old RP ID via
DELETE /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/{deviceId}and re-enroll each device under the new RP ID viaPOST /v1/projects/{projectId}/devices/passkeys/registration/optionsand/verify(GF-10016.
Security status
- 未登録IssuerはOIDC Discovery前に拒否
- JWT署名、Issuer、Audience、期限、Not Before、Scope、JWKS rotationを検証
- ChallengeはProject、Subject、用途へ紐付け、Redisで単回消費
- Project境界をAPI、query、複合外部キーで検証
- 未実装Verifierはfail closed
- Gorape RPのWebAuthn registrationでRP ID、origin、challenge、credential ID/public keyを検証
- Legacy device registration、proof、passkey registration/assertionは
amr: ["passkey"]を要求 (GF-10008) - Redis challengeはpurpose、project、subject、deviceへ結び付け、atomicに一度だけ消費 (GF-10009)
- WebAuthn attestationは許可formatとformat別trust anchorを要求し、既定はnoneを拒否
- proofは単回challengeに対するWebAuthn assertionを検証し、raw attestation evidenceは保存credentialから除去
未完了:
- Android/WebAuthn attestation証明書のCRL/OCSP検証
- Android application identity policy
- FIDO Metadata ServiceによるAAGUID status/revocation policy
- WebAuthn Windows TPM / Apple anonymous attestationの実機検証・運用trust bundle
- Windows/Linux/Web browser redirect, CORS, and RP-domain association needs per-deployment validation
- クラスタ共有Rate Limit
Backend source index
Backend documentation uses GF-1xxxx IDs to link a described behavior to its
Go implementation or schema migration. The IDs are stable references, not
runtime protocol values.
| ID | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| GF-10001 | Start HTTP and optional HTTPS listeners |
| GF-10002 | Configure middleware and register API routes |
| GF-10003 | Authenticate project/issuer bearer tokens |
| GF-10004 | Authenticate platform-administrator tokens |
| GF-10005 | Validate project tokens and resolve principals |
| GF-10006 | Resolve a project from the token issuer |
| GF-10007 | Resolve effective project/group permissions |
| GF-10008 | Require passkey AMR for device operations |
| GF-10009 | Atomically consume a one-time challenge |
| GF-10010 | Construct the configured WebAuthn RP and trust policy |
| GF-10011 | Validate RP ID and exact origin allowlist |
| GF-10012 | Create WebAuthn registration options |
| GF-10013 | Verify registration response and attestation |
| GF-10014 | Create WebAuthn assertion options |
| GF-10015 | Verify a WebAuthn assertion |
| GF-10016 | Authorize and issue device registration options |
| GF-10017 | Consume registration challenge and persist credential |
| GF-10018 | Authorize and issue device proof options |
| GF-10019 | Verify device possession and update credential state |
| GF-10020 | Read browser options through a short-lived capability |
| GF-10021 | Verify browser-mediated registration |
| GF-10022 | Verify browser-mediated assertion |
| GF-10023 | Produce a platform-admin provisioning plan |
| GF-10024 | Apply a platform-admin provisioning manifest |
| GF-10025 | Expand role keys into effective permissions |
| GF-10026 | Add WebAuthn credential state in the SQL migration |
| GF-10027 | Load and verify a signed FIDO MDS BLOB |
| GF-10028 | Look up AAGUID metadata after validating freshness |
| GF-10029 | Refresh FIDO MDS BLOB at nextUpdate and reject stale data |
| GF-10030 | Verify FIDO MDS BLOB signature, legal header, and status |
| GF-10031 | Validate Android attestation package/signing digest policy |
| GF-10032 | Configure bounded CRL/OCSP revocation checker and cache |
| GF-10033 | Fail closed on revoked or uncheckable certificate status |
| GF-10034 | Enforce optional passkey AMR, ACR, and auth_time freshness |
| GF-10035 | Issue an operation-bound WebAuthn proof request for external services |
| GF-10036 | Atomically consume and verify an external service proof request |
| GF-10037 | Normalize server listener, TLS, OIDC, attestation, and WebAuthn configuration |
| GF-10038 | Resolve assurance from verified credential evidence |
| GF-10039 | Persist verified attestation assurance evidence |
| GF-10040 | Enforce per-assurance registration policy |
| GF-10041 | Re-evaluate assurance from MDS status and revocation |
| GF-10042 | Preserve authenticator transports for cross-device hints |
| GF-10043 | Enforce assurance consistently on assertions |
| GF-10044 | Normalize the explicit WebAuthn assurance policy |
| GF-10045 | Normalize a typed-nil MDS provider before WebAuthn initialization |
Run python3 scripts/docs/link_gf_ids.py to refresh links after moving source
code. scripts/check-docs.sh verifies that every documented ID has a source
comment and a current GitHub link.